The intention of the present paper is to resettle the importance of the Comte’s thought to the philosophy of science. To do so, we discard certain prejudices about positivism and reassess certain comtean’s concepts, such as the three states law, the science’s classification and the role of hypotheses in order to restore its relevance in the background of the history of the philosophy.

Dados da tradução brasileira de HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Linhas Fundamentais da Filosofia do Direito ou Direito Natural e Ciência do Estado em Compêndio. Tradução, notas, glossário e bibliografia de Paulo Meneses et alli. Apresentações de Denis Lerrer Rosenfield e de Paulo Roberto Konzen. São Paulo: Loyola; São Leopoldo: UNISINOS, 2010.

Para deleite dos religiosos, a história da filosofia oficial − que continua, ao que parece, infectada pelo espírito teológico − consagrou a "aposta de Pascal" como uma das soluções modelares ao problema ético suscitado pela questáo clássica da existência ou náo de Deus. No raciocínio de Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), aquele que aposta na existência do deus judaico-cristáo ganhará a felicidade eterna caso ele efetivamente exista; em contrapartida, uma vez sendo este Deus uma realidade, a aposta na sua inexistência resultará na (...) danaçáo do apostador equivocado. Ocorre que a história da filosofia oficial parece desconhecer a alternativa ateísta que Denis Diderot (1713-1784) propõe a essa questáo das conseqüências da existência ou náo de Deus na vida e na morte dos seres humanos. Lançando máo de uma fábula que permite uma analogia com o tema do ateísmo, em que um ateu, depois de morrer, constata que a alma é de fato imortal, que Deus realmente existe, e que, portanto, náo ter tido fé em vida náo foi uma aposta inteligente, Diderot, no seu Diálogo de um filósofo com a Marechala de... (1774), reflete sobre os desdobramentos para o ateu dessa experiência inesperada. É sobre essa náo-aposta do ateu que trata este artigo. Palavras-chave : Aposta de Pascal, Ateísmo, Deus, Diderot, Virtude. (shrink)

ARISTÓTELES.. Econômicos. Coleção Obras Completas de Aristóteles, Volume VII – Tomo 2. Introdução, notas e tradução do original grego e latino de Delfim F. Leão. São Paulo, Martins Fontes.

"Even those professionally concerned with the problems of development find it distressingly easy to start thinking in terms of graphs and statistics and to stop thinking in terms of people--the hundreds of millions of men, women and children daily beset by poverty, hunger and illiteracy. For Denis Goulet, people remain people, and a primary challenge to those who work for world development must be "to restore the links between economic science and moral philosophy. For the development problem resurrects, in (...) a new mode, the most ancient ethical questions: what is the good life, what is the just society?" These are the issues Denis Goulet confronts in A New World Order, a provocative and controversial approach to the questions most developmentalists fail to ask or despair of answering. Commenting on both the book and its author, Paulo Freire notes: "Goulet is a sensitive and intellectually challenging man who has to be taken seriously. He does not view the Third World as a mere object about which one could become expert without simultaneously assuming that world and being assumed by it. Goulet is a restless man who never ceases to look at life with a permanent sense of astonishment, whose ethical preoccupations are born of communion with the silent regions of the world, with 'the wretched of the earth.'" In A New Moral Order Goulet attempts to speak for those "silent regions of the world," and to give voice, not only to their experience of life as harsh and dehumanizing, but to give voice as well to their vision of what life might be in a truly just global society." - Publisher. (shrink)

Este artigo trata da presença, da interpretação e do diálogo com o ceticismo na primeira fase do pensamento de Denis Diderot, em particular nos seus Pensamentos Filosóficos, palco de uma crise metafísica e religiosa que antecedeu a formulação do seu materialismo ateu.

: Este artigo é o segundo de uma tríade que trata do diálogo, mais precisamente do envolvimento, entre a filosofia de Denis Diderot e o ceticismo. O primeiro artigo, intitulado “O jovem Diderot e o ceticismo dos Pensamentos”, foi publicado na revista Dois Pontos, em sua edição dedicada ao tema do ceticismo (cf. PIVA, 2007), e limitou-se a uma análise minuciosa do problema da postura cética nos Pensamentos filosóficos, de 1746. O presente artigo, por seu turno, examina duas questões (...) fundamentais, desta vez em O passeio do cético ou As alamedas, de 1747, último livro em que o ceticismo é evocado com destaque pelo enciclopedista, dois anos antes de ele render-se definitivamente ao materialismo ateu: 1) a interpretação que Diderot desenvolve do ceticismo e 2) sua posição diante dele. Já o terceiro e derradeiro texto da tríade examinará – evidentemente, numa próxima oportunidade – a presença do ceticismo no pensamento diderotiano da maturidade, ou seja, no período que se inicia em 1749, com a redação da Carta sobre os cegos, quando a questão da dúvida cética passa a perder em suas obras a relevância que tinha na origem de suas reflexões, mudando, até mesmo, de registro. (shrink)

This paper completes a triad developed around the issue of scepticism in the enlightened thinking of Denis Diderot. The first one, entitled "The young Diderot and the scepticism of Thoughts ", was published in the journal Two Points , in its edition devoted to the subject of scepticism (cf. PIVA, 2007), and was limited to an analysis of the problem of attitude sceptical on Thoughts philosophical , in 1746. The second, "The clearing of Diderot with scepticism", published in the (...) journal Transformation (cf. PIVA, 2009), deals with two fundamental questions, this time on The tour of the sceptic or The boulevards , of 1747, latest book in that the scepticism is raised to prominence by encyclopedist, since two years later he finally surrenders to the atheistic materialism. They are: 1) the interpretation that develops Diderot's scepticism and 2) its position before him. In this paper we will examine the presence of scepticism in thought diderotiano of maturity, namely the period beginning in 1749 with the drafting of the Charter for the blind , considering how they and where it is addressed records in some of the most significant texts its philosophical maturity. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to analyze and relate two proposals for illustration made by the European philosophy of the eighteenth century, their singularities and seeking more differences than their commonalities. Both of them were developed in countries with different cultural and political conjunctures and based on the peculiarities of their respective enlightenments. This is the Aufklärung of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who became famous with the booklet Answer the question: what is "Enlightenment"?, written in 1784, and the Lumières embodied (...) by the speculator Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and mainly expressed in the entry "Philosopher" of the Encyclopedia of 1765. (shrink)

The Modern Synthesis has dominated biology for 80 years. It was formulated in 1942, a decade before the major achievements of molecular biology, including the Double Helix and the Central Dogma. When first formulated in the 1950s these discoveries and concepts seemed initially to completely justify the central genetic assumptions of the Modern Synthesis. The Double Helix provided the basis for highly accurate DNA replication, while the Central Dogma was viewed as supporting the Weismann Barrier, so excluding the inheritance of (...) acquired characteristics. This article examines the language of the Modern Synthesis and reveals that it is based on four important misinterpretations of what molecular biology had shown, so forming the basis of the four Illusions: 1. Natural Selection; 2. The Weismann Barrier; 3. The Rejection of Darwin’s Gemmules; 4. The Central Dogma. A multi-level organisation view of biology avoids these illusions through the principle of biological relativity. Molecular biology does not therefore confirm the assumptions of the Modern Synthesis. (shrink)

There is a common misconception that our genomes - all unique, except for those in identical twins - have the upper hand in controlling our destiny. The latest genetic discoveries, however, do not support that view. Although genetic variation does influence differences in various human behaviours to a greater or lesser degree, most of the time this does not undermine our genuine free will. Genetic determinism comes into play only in various medical conditions, notably some psychiatric syndromes. Denis Alexander (...) here demonstrates that we are not slaves to our genes. He shows how a predisposition to behave in certain ways is influenced at a molecular level by particular genes. Yet a far greater influence on our behaviours is our world-views that lie beyond science - and that have an impact on how we think the latest genetic discoveries should, or should not, be applied. Written in an engaging style, Alexander's book offers tools for understanding and assessing the latest genetic discoveries critically. (shrink)

Whenever a structure with a particularly interesting computability-theoretic property is found, it is natural to ask whether similar examples can be found within well-known classes of algebraic structures, such as groups, rings, lattices, and so forth. One way to give positive answers to this question is to adapt the original proof to the new setting. However, this can be an unnecessary duplication of effort, and lacks generality. Another method is to code the original structure into a structure in the given (...) class in a way that is effective enough to preserve the property in which we are interested. In this paper, we show how to transfer a number of computability-theoretic properties from directed graphs to structures in the following classes: symmetric, irreflexive graphs; partial orderings; lattices; rings ; integral domains of arbitrary characteristic; commutative semigroups; and 2-step nilpotent groups. This allows us to show that several theorems about degree spectra of relations on computable structures, nonpreservation of computable categoricity, and degree spectra of structures remain true when we restrict our attention to structures in any of the classes on this list. The codings we present are general enough to be viewed as establishing that the theories mentioned above are computably complete in the sense that, for a wide range of computability-theoretic nonstructure type properties, if there are any examples of structures with such properties then there are such examples that are models of each of these theories. (shrink)

Kant claims that we have a duty to promote our own moral perfection, but not the moral perfection of others. I examine three types of argument for this asymmetry, as well as the implications of these arguments--and their success or failure--for Kantian theory. The arguments I consider say that (first) to promote others’ perfection is impossible; (second) to try to promote others’ perfection is impermissible; and (third) one cannot be obligated to promote both others’ perfection and one’s own. I argue (...) that none of these arguments establishes Kant’s conclusion. Since the formula of humanity grounds a duty to promote our own perfection out of respect for our rational nature, the absence of an argument denying that we must promote others’ perfection suggests that we must do so (out of respect for their rational nature). Even so, Kant’s theory discourages moral paternalism and takes perfection to be a primarily self-regarding project. Thus, I also show that a Kantian duty to promote the moral perfection of others would be unobjectionable, despite the problems such a duty might initially seem to invite. (shrink)

Peu de passages de l'oeuvre de Wittgenstein ont suscité autant de commentaires et de discussions que les paragraphes des Recherches philosophiques dans lesquels il presénte ce que l'on a appele« ; l'argumentdu langage privé »;. Wittgenstein definit un langage prive comme un langage dont les mots sont censés se referer« ; á ce dont seul celui qui parle peut avoir connaissance; a ses sensations immediates et privées »;.' Il s'agit de montrer, par cet argument, Timpossibilite d'un langage comme celui-ci. Une (...) difficulte importante que pose l'interpretation de ces textes est la suivante. D'une part, pour Wittgenstein, il ne peut y avoir de reference a une experience interne, peu importe l'experience, si seul le locuteur peut savoir de quoi il parle, c'est-a-dire si sa sensation est privee. Le langage imagine est done impossible. D'autre part, pour la plupart des commentateurs des Recherches, il soutient egalement que toutes les sensations sont des experiences privees. II s'ensuit la consequence paradoxale que les mots du langage usuel par lesquels nous nous referons a des sensations ne s'y referent pas reellement. Le mot« ; douleur »;, par exemple, ne denomme pas une sensation au sens ou on dit, de facon tout a fait correcte, que le mot« ; rouge »; denomme une certaine couleur. (shrink)

Longtemps en linguistique, la sémantique a voulu reléguer la pragmatique au rang de discipline marginale. La pragmatique a enfin acquis droit de cité et consistance théorique, elle est un cadre général dans lequel les analyses traditionnelles du langage doivent être interprétées. Ainsi conçue, la pragmatique est un carrefour, point de rencontre des disciplines traitant du langage, approche actionnelle des phénomènes langagiers et communicationnels. Pages de début Prologue Chapitre Premier. Du discours à l'action Chapitre II. Genèse du concept d'assertion Chapitre III. (...) Classification des actes de discours et interactions langagières Chapitre IV. Pour une réévaluation pragmatique de l'assertion Chapitre V. Dialectique, forme dialogale et procès dialogique Chapitre VI. Modèle projectif du dialogue informatif Chapitre VII. L'intelligence de la machine et sa capacité dialogique Chapitre VIII. De l'action a la communication Épilogue Référencesbibliographiques Index des noms Index des concepts Pages de fin. (shrink)

We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of (...) Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change. (shrink)

This article represents comments arising from The Compatibility of Evolution and Design by Rope Kojonen (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) concerning the role of chance and randomness in evolution (citations from this book are shown as page numbers in brackets). The various meanings of chance and randomness as used in descriptions of biological evolution are discussed and contrasted with their meanings in mathematics and metaphysics. The discussion relates to the role of contingency in evolution and to ideological and rhetorical extrapolations from biology (...) into philosophical world views. Overall it is concluded that evolution is not a chance process, except in the epistemic sense of “chance.” Theologically, this has implications for the idea that God creates through “a free evolutionary process” and may also influence our perspectives on divine action and intentionality in evolutionary history. (shrink)

This paper explores difficulties that resolute readers of the early Wittgenstein face, arising out of what I call the ‘sheer lack’ interpretation of their ‘austere’ conception of nonsense, and the intelligibility of philosophical confusion—there being a sense in which we rightly talk of a ‘grasp’ of philosophical nonsense and indeed of its ‘logic’. Such readers depict philosophical and ‘plain’ nonsense as distinct psychological kinds; but I argue that the ‘intelligibility’ of philosophical confusion remains invisible to the kind of psychology that (...) the ‘sheer lack’ interpretation would make available to Wittgenstein. These concerns relate to well-established worries concerning whether the Tractatus’s ‘ladder’ can be climbed by thinking through arguments—or indeed by thinking full stop—if it is austerely nonsensical. Though I argue that these worries can be met, doing so requires another interpretation of ‘austerity’, which I call the ‘equivocation’ interpretation, and reveals the difference between resolute and non-resolute readings to be less clear cut than has been thought. Key here is the failure of some hard-and-fast distinctions that inform the literature—distinctions shaped by intuitions about mind, meaning, inference, logic, and nonsense—to serve us well. (shrink)

This paper examines Kant's accounts of friendship and marriage, and argues for what can be called an ideal of “moral marriage” based on Kant's notion of moral friendship. After explaining why Kant values friendship so highly, it gives an account of the ways in which marriage falls far short, according to Kant, of what friendship has to offer. The paper then argues that many of Kant's reasons for finding marriage morally impoverished compared with friendship are wrong‐headed. The paper further argues (...) that a few of Kant's views about friendship are false. The main point is that, when we slightly revise Kant's account of friendship and jettison Kant's misguided notions about marriage, we see that marriages can aspire to much of the same moral richness as friendships. Finally, the paper argues that this friendship model of marriage does not obscure the important ways in which marriages and friendships differ. (shrink)

"The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).

This paper examines a doctrine which David Lewis has called 'Humean Supervenience' (hereafter 'HS'), and a problem which certain imaginary cases seem to generate for HS. They include rotating perfect spheres or discs, and flowing rivers, imagined as composed of matter which is perfectly homogeneous right down to the individual points. Before considering these examples, I shall introduce the doctrine they seem to challenge.

Wenn die Rede auf den Fortschritt kommt, geht es um die Verbesserung der menschlichen Lebensverhältnisse. Doch die Erfahrungen modernen Gesellschaften mit Tyrannei, Kriegen, Wirtschaftskrisen und Umweltzerstörung haben das Vertrauen in die Überwindung natürlicher Abhängigkeiten und sozialer Über erschüttert. Viele sehen heute im Fortschritt eine bloße Illusion oder einen Mythos. Es scheint mir angesichts der allgegenwärtigen scharfen Kritik an der Fortschrittsidee im zeitgenössischen Denken angebracht, von einer Psychologie des Fortschritts zu sprechen. Damit meine ich nicht das Fühlen und Verhalten, das Fortschritt (...) bedingt oder umgekehrt durch ihn hervorgerufen wird; ich meine die Psychologisierung des Fortschritts: die Annahme, er sei eine reine Kopfsache, etwas Ausgedachtes oder Erhofftes, das sich durch seine Projektion auf historische oder soziale Prozesse zu einer gefahrvollen Erzählung verfestigt. "Psychologisierung des Fortschritts" ist also meine Chiffre für die projektivistische Fortschrittskritik, die ich hier ihrerseits kritisiere und der ich ein kulturalistisches Menschenbild entgegensetze. (shrink)

The standard relation of logical consequence allows for non-standard interpretations of logical constants, as was shown early on by Carnap. But then how can we learn the interpretations of logical constants, if not from the rules which govern their use? Answers in the literature have mostly consisted in devising clever rule formats going beyond the familiar what follows from what. A more conservative answer is possible. We may be able to learn the correct interpretations from the standard rules, because the (...) space of possible interpretations is a priori restricted by universal semantic principles. We show that this is indeed the case. The principles are familiar from modern formal semantics: compositionality, supplemented, for quantifiers, with topic-neutrality. (shrink)

In 1484, humanist philosopher and theologian Marsilio Ficino published the first complete Latin translation of Plato's extant works. Students of Plato now had access to the entire range of the dialogues, which revealed to Renaissance audiences the rich ancient landscape of myths, allegories, philosophical arguments, etymologies, fragments of poetry, other works of philosophy, aspects of ancient pagan religious practices, concepts of mathematics and natural philosophy, and the dialogic nature of the Platonic corpus's interlocutors. By and large, Renaissance readers in the (...) Latin West encountered Plato's text through Ficino's translations and interpretation. -/- In Plato's Persona, Denis J.-J. Robichaud provides the first synthetic study of Ficino's interpretation of the Platonic corpus. Robichaud analyzes Plato's works in their original Greek and in Ficino's Latin translations, as well as Ficino's non-Platonic writings and correspondence, in the process uncovering new aspects of Ficino's intellectual work habits. In his letters and works, Ficino self-consciously imitated a Platonic style of prose, in effect devising a persona for himself as a Platonic philosopher. Plato's dialogues are populated with a wealth of literary characters with whom Plato interacts and against whom Plato refines his own philosophies. Reading through Ficino's translations, Robichaud finds that the Renaissance philosopher seeks an understanding of Plato's persona(e) among all the dialogues' interlocutors. In effect, Ficino assumed the role of Plato's Latin spokesperson in the Renaissance. -/- Plato's Persona is grounded in an extensive study of scholarship in Renaissance humanism, classics, philosophy, and intellectual history, and contextualizes Ficino's intellectual achievements within the contemporary Christian orthodox view of Platonism. Ficino was an influential figure in the early Italian Renaissance: the key intermediary between Greek and Latin, and between manuscript and print, giving voice to Plato and access to the ancient frameworks needed to interpret his dialogues. (shrink)

What is phenomenology's contribution to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind? I am here concerned with this question, and in particular with phenomenology's contribution to what has come to be called the problem of (intentional) consciousness. The problem of consciousness has constituted the focal point of classical phenomenology as well as the main problem, and indeed perhaps the stumbling block, of the philosophy of mind in the last two decades (Fisette and Poirier 2000). Many philosophers of mind, for instance, (...) Thomas Nagel (1974), Ned Block (1995), Owen Flanagan (1977), Colin McGinn (1991) and David Chalmers (1996), have acknowledged the properly phenomenological character of this problem; Nagel is even willing to entrust the study of phenomenal consciousness to what he calls an “objective phenomenology.” Yet, the phenomenology to which these philosophers resort has little to do with the conceptual framework that was developed within the phenomenologicaltradition.They put forward an entity they term “phenomenal consciousness,” but only in the hope that it may be explained by means of the theories that currently prevail in the philosophy of mind or in cognitive sciences. (shrink)

Originally published in 1958.The history of Morley College provides an illuminating case-history of the growth and spread of adult education in the second half of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth centuries. Morley College is unique in that it was one of the first of such institutions to proclaim and inculcate absolute sex and class equality. It has always been guided by democratic principles in the sense that the students have been encouraged to play a definite part in (...) the administration of the college – an ethos which continues to this day. (shrink)

This paper situates abortion in the context of women’s duties to themselves. I argue that Kant’s fundamental moral requirement to respect oneself as a rational being, combined with Kant’s view of our animal nature, form the basis for a view of pregnancy and abortion that focuses on women’s agency and moral character without diminishing the importance of their bodies and emotions. The Kantian view of abortion that emerges takes abortion to be morally problematic, but sometimes permissible, and sometimes even required. (...) I first sketch Kant’s account to duties to oneself, highlighting duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. Next, I discuss pregnancy and the challenges it poses to women’s self-preservation, development, and efficacy as rational human agents. I then give my main argument: that abortion is morally problematic because it is antagonistic to an important subset of morally useful emotions that we have self-regarding duties to protect and cultivate. I argue that self-regarding moral considerations ground a rebuttable deliberative presumption against maxims of abortion for inclination-based ends. Finally, I consider three objections to this account of abortion : that it rests on implausible assumptions about the effects of abortion on women’s morally useful sentiments; that it portrays the virtuous agent’s reasoning about abortion as objectionably self-regarding; and that it fails adequately to recognize the moral significance of the fetus as a potential rational being. (shrink)

This Article defines four distinct conceptions of cruelty found in underdeveloped form in domestic and international criminal law sources. The definition is analytical, focusing on the types of agency, victimization, causality, and values in each conception of cruelty. But no definition of cruelty will do justice to its object until complemented by the kind of understanding practical reason provides of the implications of the phenomenon of cruelty. -/- No one should be neutral in relation to cruelty. Eminently, cruelty in criminal (...) law, a human-created phenomenon, vigorously calls for responses in the form of preventive and corrective action on the part of private and public actors. It is in this sense that cruelty is a problem of practical reason, one of action preoccupied with its legal or moral obligations, rational grounds, value commitments, and actual consequences. -/- However, the connection between conceptions of cruelty and the implications practical reason can draw from the correct application of a conception of cruelty to phenomena in the world remains too detached to be able to capture and explain people's actual experiences both of seeing cruelty in the world and of confronting the question of what to do about cruelty and how to address its cultural and institutional aspects. Something is missing. -/- What is missing is the integration of conceptions of cruelty and the practical reason implications of detecting cruelty in the world into normative models which operate as meaning matrixes for cognition, meaning, and action. This Article undertakes this explanatory task through an exercise of reconstructing seminal philosophical ideas about cruelty. The result is that the four conceptions of cruelty are placed within three distinct normative models, which ultimately render intelligible legal conceptions of cruelty and legal reactions to it. (shrink)

In this article we argue for the necessity of a new double alliance between phenomenology and cognitive sciences (through embodied theory) onthe one hand, and between phenomenological pedagogy and the embodiment paradigm on the other. We strongly believe that phenomenological pedagogyshould enter into dialogue with the cognitive sciences movement called “Embodiment” in order to renew its educational theories and practices. Indeed, thenew suggestions about the mind that come from the embodiment paradigm can already have a huge impact on learning and (...) education, but a relatively structured “pedagogy of consciousness” is still missing. This topic will be discussed with a special focus on body and embodied consciousness, which nicelybrings together these different traditions. Finally, an actual example of how the embodiment paradigm and phenomenological pedagogy can converge will be presented through the practice of meditative experience. (shrink)

Causal pre-emption scenarios are problematic for the counterfactual framework of causation (CFC) because people judge an action to be the actual cause of an outcome although the outcome would have occurred anyway due to the action of a pre-empted alternative cause. We propose that commonsense causal questions typically probe specific events that actually happened as and how they did, and show that counterfactuals that probe specific events match selections of actual cause, and dissociations only occur with non-specific counterfactuals. In addition, (...) the pre-empted action is often selected as the or an actual cause when it causes the pre-empting action (auto-pre-emption). Judgements of an action’s responsibility for the outcome track judgements of actual cause following the legal sine qua non principle. Agent reproach is also influenced by the agent's intention. The effects of causal dependency structure and counterfactual question type are robust across the intentionality of the pre-empting action and scenario content. (shrink)

Spinoza discovered and studied Descartes's philosophy at the school of Van den Enden and then at the University of Leiden. Spinoza is seen as providing metaphysical views of unparalleled audacity, which remain highly exciting and offer a source of inspiration and a source of theoretical models in a wide variety of fields, including neurobiology. The most general of Spinoza's intentions is to expound in accordance with “the prolix Geometric order” what Descartes had left in a more informal one. Spinoza's original (...) distance from Cartesian conceptions, before becoming obvious in the metaphysical views of the Ethics, is already noticeable in the TIE. In metaphysics, the Spinoza‐Descartes relationship is complex, but cannot be said to take the form of an implicit dialogue or a community of inspiration. Descartes's emphasis on the use of free will, the gap between the two authors in matters of moral anthropology is therefore quite limited. (shrink)

Le but de cet article n'est pas de fournir une quelconque interprétation de la pensée de Deleuze ou de fournir des clés de lectures pour comprendre l'anti Oedipe. Plus modestement je tente de fournir un angle d'approche de cet ouvrage. Mon point de départ est le suivant : bien que Deleuze ait rédigé un ouvrage désormais classique sur Hume, ce dernier n'est que rarement cité parmi les sources de l'anti Oedipe. De là, j'ai esquissé quelques rapprochements afin de permettre d'éclairer (...) l'approche deleuzienne de la maladie mentale. (shrink)